Governance Quality and Information Alignment by Elbadry, A et al.
 1 
Governance Quality and Information Alignment 
 
 
Ahmed Elbadry  
Lecturer, University of Cairo and Visiting Scholar, School of Management, University of Surrey, Guildford,  
Surrey, UK, GU2 7XH. E-Mail a.abdellatif@surrey.ac.uk. 
 
Dimitrios Gounopoulos 
Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom 
e-mail: d.gounopoulos@surrey.ac.uk 
 
Frank S. Skinner 
Corresponding author. Surrey Business School, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United 
Kingdom e-mail: f.skinner@surrey.ac.uk, tel +44 148 368 6364, Fax +44 148 368 6346 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper we examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
asymmetric information. Using a sample of 392 non-financial UK companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange, we find that proxies for board independence, board activeness, 
performance related executive compensation and debt financing are significantly negatively 
related to the degree of asymmetric information (as reflected in bid-ask spreads, volatility of 
returns and market price volume of shares traded), whereas ownership concentration is 
significantly positively related to asymmetric information. The results indicate that the UK 
companies in our sample have a high degree of compliance with the combined code on 
corporate governance, and as a result are likely to have higher market values.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 In this paper we address the question, to what extent do the governance decisions of 
listed companies and their shareholders explain the degree of information asymmetry in the 
market for their shares? 
The concept of asymmetric information was introduced in George A. Akerlof’s 
(1970), paper, “The Market for „Lemons‟: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”. 
Akerlof relates quality and uncertainty and develops the notion of asymmetric information, 
using the automobile market
1
 as his example. The main idea in Akerlof’s paper is that the 
parties to a transaction have unequal amounts of information about the other party. Many 
researchers, in different areas, have explored the concept of asymmetric information and 
different definitions have emerged depending on the area of application. In (1973) Michael 
Spence  developed the concept of signalling
2
. In 1975 Joseph Stiglitz introduced the idea of 
screening, which can be used, for example, by an employer to classify individuals into levels 
that replicate their efficiency or some other ability. Stiglitz (1975) applied this idea to the 
insurance market, which is characterized by asymmetric information problems, leading to 
both moral hazard and adverse selection
3
.  
                                               
1 Akerlof explained that in many markets the buyer uses some market statistic to measure the value of a class of 
goods. The asymmetry is between the information held by the seller of the used car, for example, and the buyer. 
Thus, the buyer sees the average of the whole market, while the seller has more knowledge of a specific item. 
Rosser (2003, p.10) shows that “awareness of their relative ignorance would lead potential buyers to assume 
that any used car would have a high probability of being low quality, a „lemon‟”. On the other hand, Akerlof 
argues that this information asymmetry provides the seller with a reason to sell goods of less than the average 
market quality. Then, the average quality of goods in the market will decrease and so will the market size, which 
can lead to market failure.  
2 In his example, the asymmetry is between an employer and a potential employee. Spence models hiring 
employees as an investment decision made under uncertainty. The employer is not sure of the characteristics of 
a person before hiring. Even after hiring the characteristics are not obviously clear, as some job learning and 
training has to be done. Because the employer is unable to distinguish clearly the skills of the potential 
employee, he relies on signals (Rosser, 2003). Miller (2002, p.44) argues that “markets with asymmetric 
information are incomplete because they lack markets for specific levels of product quality. Such markets either 
lump all qualities together (lemons) or use external indications of quality to separate them (signalling)”.  
3
 He defines screening as classifying the qualities of goods. The screening mechanism is designed to offer a 
diversity of deals that encourage agents to disclose accurate information about their riskiness through a process 
of self-selection. Further, mechanisms or devices that perform screening activities are called screening devices 
(Rosser, 2003). 
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              Klein et al. (2002) observe that, “in corporate finance, asymmetric information 
refers to the notion that firm insiders, typically the managers, have better information than do 
market participants on the value of their firm‟s assets and investment opportunities”. This 
results in an agency problem. According to agency theory
4
, agency problems arise as a result 
of the divergence of interests among agents and principals but impose costs only to the extent 
that principals cannot write perfect contracts (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Miller (2002)). Principals cannot write perfect contracts because of 
asymmetric information concerning the efforts and actions of agents. Because the principals 
cannot perfectly monitor or measure the behaviour of agents (Haniffa and Hudaib (2006)), 
agency costs are incurred. They are manifest when the agents (managers) impose additional 
direct costs on the firm such as personal perquisites or by imposing opportunity costs such as 
shirking, and by imposing uncertainty in the value of the firm’s shares since the existence but 
not the extent of these agency costs is known to the market (Jensen and Meckling, (1976); 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Rosser (2003)).  
Corporate governance mechanisms are an indirect and probably imperfect tool by 
which shareholders, as principals, attempt to reduce agency costs by changing the behaviour 
of managers, who are the agents of the shareholders (Deshmukh (2005), Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2007); Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007); Chen et al., (2007)). Managers’ actions can be 
changed by mitigating asymmetric information in two ways: by reducing asymmetric 
information directly through incentives, and by reducing it indirectly through monitoring. 
                                               
4 The literature has many models and theories related to the concept of asymmetric information. Kennedy et al. 
(2006) review asymmetric information models in a multi-period setting to explain underpricing in IPOs. These 
models are signalling, information production, market feedback, entrepreneurial losses, changing objective 
function, and the information momentum models. Deshmukl (2005) classified the theories of asymmetric 
information which related to the dividend policy into two theories, pecking order theory and signalling theory. 
Also, there are two theories that are the closest to the theory of asymmetric information, namely the theory of 
agency and the theory of incomplete contracts. 
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Specifically, bonuses may be earned only when managers reveal the level of effort they 
expend, thereby reducing asymmetric information concerning their actions. In addition, 
corporate governance mechanisms might reduce asymmetric information indirectly by 
improving monitoring systems, by splitting the role of the CEO from the chair of the board of 
directors, or by increasing the number of independent directors on the board. These measures 
inhibit collusion, and make it more difficult for managers to hide their perquisite 
consumption and shirking behaviour, while opening a window through which the 
shareholders view the behaviour of the managers.  
There has been limited investigation of the relationship between the nature of the 
firm’s corporate governance and the degree of asymmetric information; much of the evidence 
that has been acquired is contradictory. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Perotti and Thadden 
(2003), Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009) find that large 
shareholders can reduce asymmetric information and improve long-term performance. In 
contrast, Heflin and Shaw (2000), O'Neill and Swisher (2003) and Fehle (2004) find that 
greater institutional ownership is associated with greater information asymmetry, as there is a 
lower degree of informed trading.  
Studies that do examine the relation between corporate governance and asymmetric 
information usually deal with limited aspects, or individual mechanisms, of corporate 
governance. Cai et al. (2006), Hillier and McColgan (2006), Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) and 
Holm and Scholer (2010) find that board independence reduces asymmetric information, 
while Peasnell et al. (2005) suggest that board independence aids the integrity of financial 
statements. Wruck (1993) and Kang et al. (2006) examine the importance of the form of 
executive compensation in reducing agency problems and mitigating asymmetric information. 
Chi and Scott-Lee (2010) and Chen et al. (2010) show that high amounts of free cash flow 
and external financing needs reduce information asymmetry among firms and strengthen the 
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influence of the quality of corporate governance practices on firm value respectively. In 
contrast, we provide a more comprehensive review of the relationship between corporate 
governance and asymmetric information by exploring the ability of 18 proxies for corporate 
governance to explain three measures of asymmetric information. 
 We have five main hypotheses. The first and second hypotheses are that the more 
independent and the more active the board of directors, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. Our third hypothesis is that compensation schemes that are designed to enhance 
performance also reduce asymmetric information. Our fourth hypothesis is that, since inside 
ownership is presumed to increase agency costs, increases in ownership concentration also 
increase asymmetric information. The final (fifth) hypothesis is that, since debt financing 
improves the monitoring of management, it reduces asymmetric information.  
   We find strong support for all five hypotheses. Proxies related to board 
independence and board activity, performance-related executive compensation schemes, and 
debt financing are inversely related to the degree of asymmetric information, whereas proxies 
related to ownership concentration are directly related to it. Therefore, we are able to address 
John and Senbet (1998) by finding that governance mechanisms that encourage board 
independence and greater board activity, greater use of performance-related executive 
compensation schemes and debt financing, while discouraging ownership concentration, 
appear to result in a better market outcome. Overall, our results also suggest that the 
recommendations of the combined code on corporate governance of 2003 regarding board 
independence and activity and the use of performance-related executive compensation 
schemes can play a role in reducing the degrees of asymmetric information. Our findings are 
robust with respect to industry, firm size, and calendar year, and to the use of alternative 
proxies for board composition, board activity and ownership concentration.  
 6 
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses measures of 
asymmetric information; Section 3 deals with measures of corporate governance and presents 
the five hypotheses; Section 4 explains the model and sample, and contains descriptive 
statistics; Section 5 covers data analysis and hypothesis testing. Robustness checks and 
conclusions are reported in sections 6 and our conclusions are presented in section 7. 
 
2. MEASURING ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
 
As there is no generally accepted “best” measure of asymmetric information, we choose three 
that are most commonly used in the literature: the spread ratio, volatility and share volume 
measured at market prices.
5
 Studies by George et al. (1991), Lin et al. (1995), Madhavan et al. 
(1997) and Huang and Stoll (1997) analyse the bid-ask spread into its order processing, 
inventory holding and asymmetric information cost components. However, Van Ness et al. 
(2001) indicate a strong correlation among all the components of the spread while Menyah 
and Paudyal (2000) find that, on the London Stock Exchange, the asymmetric information 
cost component dominates the realised spread.
6
 Taken together, these papers suggest that the 
adverse selection component behaves in much the same way as the entire spread, and so 
justifies the use of the bid-ask spread as a proxy variable for asymmetric information. Thus, 
we expect that the larger the bid-ask spread, the larger the degree of asymmetric information 
will be.  
We follow Kanagaretnam et al. ((2005), (2007)) to calculate the annual bid-ask spread 
ratio (SPREAD) from observations of the daily closing bid and ask prices for each company 
                                               
5 There are many other proxies for asymmetric information. For example, Ness, Ness, and Warr (2001) suggest 
informed trader variables such as the number of analysts covering a given company and the percentage of stock 
of a given company held by an institution. Kanagaretnam et al. (2005) examine other proxies, specifically  
earnings forecast dispersion, forecast revision volatility, the level of analyst coverage and the change in share 
trade depth around quarterly earnings releases.  
6 Menyah and Paudyal (2000) find that on the LSE on average 30% of the spread is the order processing cost, 
23% is inventory cost and 47% is the asymmetric information cost. 
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and year in the sample. This data is collected from Bloomberg. Specifically, the spread ratio 
for company i and year y is 
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where n is the number of trading days t in year y. 
Van Ness et al. (2001) use the average volatility of daily stock returns in addition to 
the bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry. Wang (1993) shows that 
information asymmetry among investors can increase volatility, although Pardo and Torro 
(2007) and Gray et al. (2009) caution that volatility can overstate the level of asymmetric 
information. Accordingly, we assume that the higher the average volatility in daily stock 
return (VOLATILITY), the higher the degree of asymmetric information. 
We use share trading volume as our third measure, since Draper and Paudyal ((1999) 
(2008)) indicate that daily average trading volume, measured at market prices, is inversely 
related to asymmetric information. According to Van Ness et al. (2001), average trading 
volume is related to information asymmetry because less is known about less frequently 
traded stocks. Acker et al. (2002) report that high trading volumes are associated with closing 
prices more often within the daily spread and indicates lower levels of information 
asymmetry. Moreover, Tung and Marsden (2000) find increased trading volume in the 
presence of legally derived private information, but decreased volume in the evident presence 
of informed insiders. Gajewski (1999) finds that trading volume is larger on announcement 
days, suggesting that higher trading volumes are associated with the possible release of 
information. Hence, we expect that the higher the average trading volume (VOLUME), the 
lower the degree of asymmetric information. 
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3. MEASURING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The main theoretical aim of this paper is to develop hypotheses concerning the influence of 
corporate governance on the degree of asymmetric information. We develop 18 proxies for 
corporate governance, grouped into five categories. Specifically, the five categories are board 
composition, board activity, executive compensation, ownership structure and debt financing. 
We regress these corporate governance proxies on measures of asymmetric information. We 
also incorporate two control variables, market capitalization to control for firm size, and 
industry category to control for industry specific effects.
7
  
Fama and Jensen (1983), Denis and McConnell (2003) and Pike et al. (2005) 
recognize the essential role played by the board of directors in monitoring management. 
Recently, Becker-Blease and Irani (2008) and Lin et al. (2008) have found that board 
independence reduces asymmetric information during a seasoned equity offering. Also, 
Hillier and McColgan (2006) find that firms with a higher proportion of independent 
directors have superior performance records, resulting in higher share prices. As there is a 
consensus that independent boards are more effective monitors of management and thereby 
encourage better performance, we predict that: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is an inverse relationship between the characteristics of the board 
that are consistent with standards of best practice for corporate governance and the degree of 
asymmetric information. 
 
We use eight variables that measure the composition and size of the board of directors. 
These are the number of directors serving on the (i) remuneration, (ii) nomination and (iii) 
                                               
7 These variables are defined in Table 2. 
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audit committees, (iv) the number of non-executive directors, (v) board size, (vi) the presence 
of a non-executive chairman, (vii) the split in the responsibilities of the CEO and Chairman 
and (viii) the percentage of females on the board of directors.  
According to the UK combined code on corporate governance of 2003, the 
remuneration, nomination and audit committees should be composed of non-executive 
directors. Therefore, the larger the committee size, the greater the committees’ independence, 
as larger committees are more likely to include non-executives. Evidently, it is felt that the 
more these committees are independent of executive control, the more effective these 
committees will be in exercising good corporate governance. That is, more independent 
boards can be more exacting monitors of executive behaviour and indirectly can reduce 
information asymmetry. While there is little empirical evidence regarding the effect of 
committee size or degree of independence on information asymmetry, Becker-Blease and 
Irani (2008) report that the size of the audit committee mitigates asymmetric information 
during a seasoned equity offering. Similarly, Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) indicate that board 
independence reduces information asymmetry around the time of a quarterly earnings 
announcement. Accordingly, we expect that the larger the number of directors serving on the 
remuneration (RCSIZE), nomination (NCSIZE) and audit committees (ACSIZE), the lower 
the asymmetry. Further, the larger the number of non-executive directors (NONEXESIZE) 
serving on the board of directors, the greater the board’s independence and hence the lower 
the asymmetry. 
Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the number of directors serving on the board. Cai et 
al. (2006) suggest that the number of directors can influence disclosure activities. Larger 
boards are more likely to have some independent members, so they are more likely to be 
more effective monitors of senior management. Therefore, we expect an inverse relation 
between board size and information asymmetry.  
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The corporate governance literature suggests that power should not be concentrated 
exclusively with one executive, as that executive will tend to dominate the Board of Directors. 
Accordingly the UK combined code on corporate governance of 2003 recommends that the 
roles of the chairman of the board and the CEO be split, and that the chairman of the board 
should not also be an executive. We employ two dummy variables, CEO/Chairman split and 
non-executive chairman, to gauge the concentration of power in the top ranks of the firm. 
CEO/Chairman split is equal to one if the two positions are split and zero otherwise, while 
non-executive chairman NONEXECHAIR is equal to one if the chairman is a non-executive 
director and zero otherwise. We expect that splitting the two positions and appointing a non-
executive chair will lead to less information asymmetry, as there will be more effective 
monitoring of the CEO at board level.  
Finally, Cai et al. (2006) suggest that share prices are more likely to be information 
efficient when the board includes female directors. Thus we predict that the greater the 
fraction of females on the board FEMALETOBOARD the lower the degree of information 
asymmetry.  
Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) suggest that boards and committees that meet more 
frequently are likely to be monitoring management more closely, which should at least 
indirectly mitigate information asymmetry. Thus, we hypothesis that: 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is an inverse relationship between the level of board activity and 
the degree of asymmetric information. 
 
We use four variables to measure the activity of the board and its’ committees. These 
are the annual number of meetings of the board (BOARDMEETS), the remuneration 
committee (RCMEETS), the audit committee (ACMEETS), and the nomination committee 
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(NCMEETS). Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) find that the number of board meetings and audit 
committee meetings are inversely related to the bid-ask spread around the date of a quarterly 
earnings announcement. We expect this effect to be more wide-spread so that, as the number 
of meetings increase, the degree of information asymmetry decreases.  
Performance-related benefits and bonuses are designed to enhance shareholder value 
by encouraging managers to reveal the level of effort they expend, and to avoid shirking and 
consuming perquisites. Wruck (1993) shows that companies with investment disincentives 
have CEO compensation that emphasizes equity ownership relative to other forms of 
executive compensation. Camara (2001) suggests that both equity incentives and regular 
periodic compensation are required to motivate managers to take actions that maximize 
shareholders’ wealth. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that it is better to grant 
management long term incentives in order to align management’s interests with those of 
investors. Additionally, according to Kang et al. (2006), equity-based compensation is the 
most powerful means of aligning the interests of the CEO and shareholders. Compensation 
packages that reward managerial performance also reduce asymmetric information, because 
managers are encouraged to reveal the level of effort they expend in order to qualify for 
performance payments. Thus we hypothesise that:  
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is an inverse relationship between compensation schemes that are 
designed to enhance performance and the degree of asymmetric information. 
 
We use three proxies for executive compensation schemes that are designed to reward 
performance and thereby to reveal asymmetric information. First, CEO benefits and bonuses 
ratio (CEOBENEFITS) is defined as the ratio of the CEO’s benefits and bonuses to the 
CEO’s total annual income. Since benefits and bonuses are performance-related, we expect 
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that the higher the ratio of CEO benefits and bonuses, the lower will be the degree of 
asymmetric information. Second, CEO long-term mix (CEOLONGCOMP) is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO is remunerated with stock options or payments 
from the performance plan and 0 otherwise. We expect that long-term incentive schemes will 
encourage better performance and reduce the degree of asymmetric information. Third, 
executive benefits and bonuses (BENEFITS) is defined as a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 if executives (other than the CEO) are remunerated with benefits, bonus and stock 
options and 0 otherwise. We expect that executive benefits and bonuses schemes will 
encourage better performance and also reduce the degree of asymmetric information. 
The effect of ownership concentration on asymmetric information is uncertain. On the 
one hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Florackis and Ozkan (2009) suggest that large 
shareholders are effective in supervising management, while Bozec and Laurin (2008) argue 
that large shareholders are able to improve long-term performance. Correspondingly, Perotti 
and Thadden (2003) document that dominant investors such as large lenders or large equity 
holders can improve corporate governance, and Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) conclude that 
block-holders appear to play a role in mitigating agency problems. 
On the other hand, more block-holders means more concentrated ownership, where 
blockholders can influence management to take actions in the blockholders’ interests and 
contrary to the interests of the other shareholders. Heflin and Shaw (2000) and O'Neill and 
Swisher (2003) suggest that greater institutional ownership can cause an increase in adverse 
selection costs. Dong and Ozkan (2008) note the increasing importance of institutional 
investors in UK companies, finding that 80% of shares outstanding are held by financial 
institutions. A close examination of the annual reports of our sample of UK companies 
reveals that the majority of block-holders are institutional shareholders, such as pension plans 
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and hedge funds.
8
 Thus, the effect of block ownership in the UK capital market should be 
consistent with the model proposed by O'Neill and Swisher (2003). Therefore, we anticipate 
that the higher the ratio of block ownership, the larger the degree of asymmetric information. 
Moreover, we expect that the larger the holding of the largest investor, the larger the degree 
of asymmetric information. Hence, we hypothesise that: 
 
H4: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and 
asymmetric information. 
 
We use two variables to measure the relation between ownership concentration and 
asymmetric information. First, percentage block ownership (BLOCKOWN) is defined as the 
fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders such as institutions, families and 
anchor investors who hold more than 3% of the shares outstanding. Second, we use the 
fraction of outstanding shares owned by the largest block-holder (LARGESTOWN).    
 Debt financing can be viewed as a mechanism to mitigate asymmetric information 
because creditors are motivated to monitor the behaviour of management in order to protect 
their claims. Degryse and Jong (2006) state that “leverage, and particularly bank debt, is a 
key disciplinary mechanism which reduces the managerial discretion problem and 
asymmetric information problem”. Bebchuk (2003) concurs with this, stating that company 
debt can act as a disciplinary device to limit managerial discretion and asymmetric 
information, and works towards aligning manager and shareholder interests. We use the total 
debt to total assets ratio (DEBTRATIO) as a proxy for the level of debt financing. Lenders 
monitor the behaviour of managers as they periodically examine compliance with debt 
covenants. Thus we hypothesise that: 
                                               
8 We cannot obtain a precise breakdown of block-holders into institutional versus non-institutional, as the details 
published in the financial statements are sometimes ambiguous. Nevertheless it is clear that, even counting the 
ambiguous entries as non-institutional, block-holders are dominated by institutional investors. 
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H5: Ceteris paribus, there is an inverse relationship between levels of debt financing and 
asymmetric information. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The target population is defined as non-financial UK companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. Financial firms are excluded because of extreme differences in their capital 
structures and regulatory environment compared with other firms. We also exclude firms 
without annual reports or firms that were first listed after 2003. Table 1 shows that the final 
sample is comprised of 392 UK firms comprising of industrials (43.62%), consumer services 
(20.66%), technology (10.71%) and consumer goods (9.95%). Since industrials appear to 
dominate our sample, we later check on the robustness of our results by separately examining 
industrial and non-industrial firms. 
 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
The data is collected from the London Stock Exchange, Bloomberg and the company 
annual reports. From the London Stock Exchange we collect the industry classification of 
listed companies. Company financial and market data is from Bloomberg and corporate 
governance data is from the companies’ annual reports.  
We collect all the data that we could find for all 392 firms annually from 2003 to 
2006. This means we collect a panel data series of 392 cross sectional and four annual 
observations for a potential dataset of 1,568 observations. Unfortunately, we were unable to 
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confirm or update the value of all variables. In every year, rather than assuming that the 
values of such variables were unchanged from the previous year, they were coded as missing.  
Our panel has 392 companies, but factors in only 4 years. Under these circumstances 
we do not use a fixed effects estimator (Judge et al., (1985)). An analysis of variance test 
does reveal clear evidence of time effects. For these reasons we fit a random and time effects 
model.
9
 
Accordingly, we study the effect of corporate governance variables on the degree of 
asymmetric information using the following three (j) panel regression models on 392 (i) 
companies of (potentially) 4 (t) time series observations each using a random and time effects 
estimator. 
 
(1)                                           Variables Governance ,,ti,j,,, tijjjtijY    
Where: 
j = 1 = SPREAD,  
j = 2 = VOLATILITY,  
j = 3 = VOLUME,  
α = Regression intercept 
εj,i,t = The random error term for each regression j and company i and date t. 
 
The definitions of all 18 governance variables and the expected signs of the coefficients are 
reported in Table 2. 
 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
 
                                               
9 A fixed effects model would consume 392 degrees of freedom, to allow the constant term to vary by company. 
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            Table 3 Panel A shows that the means of SPREAD, VOLATILITY and VOLUME are 
2.44%, 32.56% and approximately 500 million shares per day respectively. These variables 
exhibit high levels of variability as measured by their standard deviations of 3.43, 19.13 and 
1.3 million respectively. Clearly there are large differences in the degree of asymmetric 
information among UK non-financial companies. 
            Table 3, Panel B, also shows that many proxies for corporate governance have a large 
degree of variability possibility because of the large variation in the size of UK companies in 
our sample. Note the high standard deviation 10,847 of COMPANYSIZE. This large degree 
of variation among the UK companies’ sizes suggest that we have a rich dataset that can 
explain the large differences in board composition and activeness, compensation plans, 
ownership structure and debt structure. Later we examine the robustness of our results by 
company size. 
 
<<Table 3 about here>> 
 
A detailed analysis of the sample indicates that the data is not normally distributed.
10
 
A lack of normality together with the possibility of empirical non-linear relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables and concentrations of the data around 
certain values lead Cooke (1998) to suggest that in cases such as these the original data be 
transformed to normal scores using the Van der Waerden (1952) approach.
11
 Using 
normalised transformations of our data in later regressions has the advantage of preserving 
monotonicity between the dependent and independent variables, disperses data concentration 
                                               
10
 The results of these normality tests are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
11 Normalization equalizes the intervals between data points by approximating where scores estimated from the 
underlying data fall along a normal distribution. In the Van der Waerden approach, normal scores are estimated 
from the underlying data by ranking data points according to the scheme r/(w+1) where w is the sum of the data 
series and r is the rank of a given data point. This score is then converted into quantiles of the normal 
distribution. These quantile scores are then used in the regressions. 
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and improves the reliability of the standard errors. Accordingly, we transform the continuous 
dependent and independent variables using normal scores and perform our correlation and 
regression analysis with the transformed variables, as is found in other papers in the corporate 
governance literature (Cooke (1998), Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Mangena and 
Tauringana (2007)).  
 
5. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Table 4, Panels A and B, provides the Pearson correlations between the corporate governance 
and asymmetric information variables. In some cases, e.g. between BSIZE and 
NONEXESIZE, the Pearson correlation exceeds 0.7, thereby indicating a possible 
collinearity problem. We further examine the extent to which collinearity affects the results 
by computing the variance inflation factors VIF for each independent variable. The usual rule 
of thumb is that a VIF of 10 or more is evidence of high collinearity. The results of this 
analysis along with the obvious collinearity problems evident in later regressions cause us to 
drop BSIZE, RCSIZE, NCSIZE, RCMEETS, NCMEETS and LARGESTOWN, as all are 
highly correlated with other, more significant explanatory variables. We also eliminate 
BENEFITS from the later regressions, as this variable is not statistically significant in any 
subsequent regression, a point to which we will return later. Subsequently, we replace 
NONEXESIZE, ACMEETS and BLOCKOWN in the regression models with their 
corresponding variables that were dropped for collinearity reasons (namely BSIZE, 
RCMEETS and LARGESTOWN) to check on the robustness of our proxies for board 
composition, board activity and ownership concentration. 
 
<<Table 4 about here>> 
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The regression analysis proceeds in two steps. First we fit the full regression model, 
and then we fit a reduced regression model by including only those variables that are most 
significant in the full model. The second step represents our attempt to find a set of corporate 
governance variables that are particularly effective in minimising asymmetric information.  
Table 5 presents the results of the full regression of (1). While all regressions explain 
the relation between asymmetric information and proxies for corporate governance to some 
extent, the R
2
 of the model for SPREAD (about 50%) is noticeably higher than the 
explanatory powers of the models for the other two proxies for asymmetric information. It is 
gratifying to note that, in the 14 instances where a proxy coefficient is statistically significant, 
13 have the sign that we expect.  
The sole exception is the unexpected sign of BOARDMEETS in the VOLATILITY 
regression, suggesting that more board meetings are associated with higher levels of 
asymmetric information. Ex post it may be that uncertain situations require additional board 
meetings to resolve them. 
 
<< Tables 5 about here>> 
 
Table 6, Panel A presents reduced form regression models by dropping the proxies 
SPLIT, NONEXECHAIR, NCSIZE, BOARDMEETINGS, FEMALETOBOARD and 
CEOLONGCOMP, because Table 5 indicate other proxies for the same hypothesis are of 
greater statistical significance. We conduct a chi-square test to determine if the joint 
contribution of these six variables is zero, and find that we are unable to reject this 
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hypothesis.
12
 Because these six excluded variables appear to be less important in explaining 
the relation between corporate governance and asymmetric information, we drop them and 
focus the remaining analysis on the proxies that do appear to matter, namely NONEXESIZE, 
ACMEETS, CEOBENFITS, BLOCKOWN and DEBTRATIO.  
Table 6 reports that NONEXESIZE, ACMEETS, CEOBENFITS, BLOCKOWN and 
DEBTRATIO collectively explain 53% of the SPREAD measure of asymmetric information 
and 31.2% of the VOLUME measure. The model for VOLATILITY yields a poorer fit, as 
this same set of variables explains only 15.8% of the VOLATILITY measure.  
 
<< Table 6 about here>> 
 
As an additional step, we re-estimated the model of Table 6, Panel A with an 
alternative specification that replaces NONEXESIZE, ACMEETS and BLOCKOWN with 
BSIZE, RCMEETS and LARGESTOWNER. This additional regression yields the same 
conclusions. Specifically, as can be seen in Table 6, Panel B, the alternative proxies for board 
independence (BSIZE), board activeness (RCMEETS) and ownership structure 
(BLOCKOWNER) are significantly related to asymmetric information.
 
 
Overall, we find that the number of non-executive directors serving on the board, the 
number of audit committee meetings per year, the ratio of CEO benefits to total CEO income, 
the fraction of outstanding shares held by block-holders and the total debt ratio are the most 
important factors in mitigating asymmetric information in the UK capital market. This result 
is one answer to John and Senbet’s (1998) query regarding what would be a more effective 
set of governance mechanisms that constitutes an optimal governance structure. We now turn 
to formal tests of our five hypotheses. 
                                               
12 We exclude the results of this simple test for the sake of brevity. They are available from the corresponding 
author on request. 
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(i) Board Characteristics and Board Activity 
Evidently, NONEXESIZE dominates all other proxies for board characteristics. For 
all measures of asymmetric information, Table 5 and Table 6 Panel A show that the larger the 
number of non-executive directors on the board, the lower the degree of asymmetric 
information. Therefore, we find strong support for our first hypothesis, namely that best 
practice for corporate governance, in this instance more outside representation on the board 
of directors, does reduce the degree of asymmetric information.  
All of the other board characteristics (SPLIT, NONEXECHAIR and NCSIZE) only 
occasionally exhibit a significant relation with asymmetric information, suggesting that the 
number of non-executive directors is the most consistent measure of board independence and 
dominates the other board characteristics as proxies for it. A possible explanation for this 
result is that there is already a high degree of compliance with the UK combined code on 
corporate governance of 2003, so there is insufficient variation in these components to 
explain variation in the measures of asymmetric information. The variable SPLIT in Table 3 
shows that during the sample years from 2003 to 2006, 90% of the UK companies in the 
sample separated the roles of Chairman and CEO. Similarly the variable NONEXECHAIR 
shows that 71% of the UK companies in the sample had a non-executive director as 
Chairman. Finally, most of the UK companies in our sample had remuneration, audit and 
nomination committees as recommended by the combined code. Specifically, of the 392 
companies in our sample, 387 had remuneration, 385 had nomination and 388 had audit 
committees for at least one year in the sample. Moreover, NONEXESIZE is roughly half of 
BSIZE, suggesting that the remuneration, nomination and audit committees are dominated by 
outside directors. These results are consistent with a high level of compliance with the 
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combined code, since according to the code these committees should be composed of at least 
3 independent non-executive directors.  
Another board composition variable is worthy of discussion. We find no significant 
relation between female representation on the board of directors (FEMALTOBOARD) and 
measures of asymmetric information. Cai et al. (2006) suggest that the presence of female 
directors would lessen information asymmetry. Again, the descriptive statistics of Table 3 
Panel B offer an explanation. The mean of FEMALTOBOARD is 18%. This result suggests 
that there was a low level of representation of females on boards of directors, so the influence 
of female representation on asymmetric information was also weak for this sample of 
companies and in these years.  
We have support for the second hypothesis, that active boards reduce asymmetric 
information. ACMEETS is significantly related to SPREAD and BOARDMEETS is 
significantly related to VOLUME, meaning that the higher the number of audit committee 
and board meetings, the lower the degree of asymmetric information.  
 
(ii) Executive Compensation 
We find strong support for our third hypothesis, namely that compensation schemes 
that are designed to encourage performance also reduce asymmetric information: 
CEOBENEFITS is highly significant when using SPREAD and VOLUME as the measures of 
asymmetric information. We note that the average of CEOBENEFITS, as reported in Table 3 
Panel B, is 35.03%. This result reflects compliance of UK companies with the combined code 
since the combined code recommends that a significant portion of executive compensation 
should be related to performance. 
Given the significance of CEOBENEFITS, it is surprising that CEOLONGCOMP and 
BENEFITS are not statistically significant. The descriptive statistics of Table 3 Panel B offer 
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an explanation, because 91% and 92% of our sample respectively use long-term 
compensation plans to compensate the CEO and performance related pay schemes to 
compensate non-CEO executives. Consequently, since CEOLONGCOMP and BENEFITS 
are dummy variables, virtually all entries in our dataset are one, so that there is insufficient 
variation in the data to detect an effect.  
 (iii) Ownership Structure 
Our fourth hypothesis states that asymmetric information increases with ownership 
concentration and an element of the literature suggests that this relation can be affected by the 
type of investor as well. We find that BLOCKOWN is highly significant when using 
SPREAD, VOLATILITY and VOLUME as measures of asymmetric information. Rather 
than reducing asymmetric information by increasing the level of monitoring of senior 
management, these results consistently show that greater share ownership concentration by 
block-holders is associated with more, not less, information asymmetry. By reviewing the 
names of block-holders in our sample as reported by the companies’ annual reports and in the 
Bloomberg database, we find that, consistent with Dong and Ozkan (2008), a substantial 
majority of the blockholders are institutional investors. This result implies that the increasing 
concentration of block-holdings by UK institutional investors, as noted by Dong and Ozkan 
(2008), has increased the degree of asymmetric information.  
 
 (iv) Debt Financing 
 Finally, we find support for our fifth hypothesis, namely, that asymmetric 
information decreases in debt financing. Our proxy for debt financing (DEBTRATIO) is 
statistically significant and of the correct sign when we use SPREAD or VOLATILITY as the 
measure of asymmetric information. This result suggests that debt financing also serves as a 
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mechanism for reducing asymmetric information, because lenders monitor the behaviour of 
managers as they periodically examine compliance with debt covenants.  
 
6. ROBUSTNESS 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of our robustness checks. We examine the robustness of our 
results by examining the year of analysis, differences in the results for small and large 
companies, and differences between industrial and non-industrial companies. We examine the 
results by calendar year because we explore if any annual effect is driving our results. We 
examine the difference among small and large companies because we suspect that small 
companies may focus on different corporate governance mechanisms. In order to do this, 
companies are classified as large when they have a market capitalization greater than the 
median of £309 million, and small when market capitalization is less than the median.  
Finally, because a large number of companies in the sample are concentrated in the industrial 
sector, we check to see whether industry classification dictates the results for the entire 
sample.  
 
<< Table 8 about here>> 
 
We use the SPREAD as the proxy measure for asymmetric information in our 
robustness work because our earlier results suggest that SPREAD is a useful measure for 
asymmetric information. Also, we use the most significant corporate governance variables (as 
reported in Table 6, Panel A) because, collectively, they are the most influential when 
explaining asymmetric information in the UK. We repeat our robustness analysis in Tables 7 
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Panel B and Table 8 Panel B, using the same alternative corporate governance variables 
previously used in Table 6 Panel B. 
In general, Table 7 Panel A and B and Table 8 Panel A and B show that our results 
are not affected by the calendar year or by the industry, but we do find a firm size effect. In 
particular, we find that our proxy for debt financing (DEBTRATIO) is significant for small 
companies but not for large companies. One explanation for this result is that small firms face 
a greater hurdle and may well have to agree to more stringent monitoring in order to qualify 
for greater debt financing.  
 
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Using a sample of 392 non-financial UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
from 2003 to 2006, we examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
asymmetric information. While corporate governance mechanisms are designed to mitigate 
agency costs, they may accomplish this by reducing asymmetric information. This can 
happen directly through incentives that encourage managers to reveal information concerning 
their level of effort and perquisite consumption, in order to qualify for incentive payments. 
This can also happen indirectly, as many corporate governance mechanisms are designed to 
improve monitoring, making it difficult for managers to conceal the extent of their shirking 
and of their perquisites consumption.  
In general, we find strong evidence that there is indeed an inverse relation between 
best practice corporate governance mechanisms and asymmetric information. Specifically, 
we find that independent and active boards, a greater reliance on performance related 
payment systems, and the use of debt financing all reduce asymmetric information, whereas 
greater ownership concentration is associated with increased information asymmetry. The 
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results are robust to a variety of proxies for these corporate governance mechanisms, and to a 
variety of measures of asymmetric information. The results are also robust to the year of 
analysis, to a sample of industrial versus non-industrial firms, and, for the most part, to the 
size of the firm. Moreover, we find that the number of non-executive directors serving in the 
board, the number of audit committee meetings per year, the ratio of CEO benefits to total 
CEO income, the fraction of outstanding shares held by block-holders and the total debt ratio 
are the most important factors in mitigating information asymmetry in the UK capital market. 
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Table 1 
Sample composition according to industry, number of companies, and the percent of each 
industry to total sample 
Notes: The target population includes all non-financial UK companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange during the period 2003 to 2006. The names and main industry of these companies are from the 
London Stock Exchange.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Main-Industry Number % 
Basic Materials 19 4.85 
Consumer Goods 39 9.95 
Consumer Services 81 20.66 
Health Care 19 4.85 
Industrials 171 43.62 
Oil & Gas 8 2.04 
Technology 42 10.71 
Telecommunication 5 1.28 
Utilities 8 2.04 
Total 392 100.00 
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Table 2 
Variables and Definitions 
Variable (relation with 
asymmetric information) 
Definition 
Asymmetric information variables 
SPREAD (+) 
The annual mean value of the daily percentage spread between bid and ask 
prices 
VOLATILITY (+) 
The annual average standard deviation of the day-over-day difference in 
the daily price change 
VOLUME (-) The annual average of daily market value of trading volume 
Corporate governance variables 
BSIZE (-) The number of directors serving on the board of directors 
NONEXESIZE (-) The number of non-executives serving on the board of directors 
SPLIT (-) 
A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the CEO and Chairman 
are different persons, zero otherwise 
NONEXECHAIR (-) 
A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the chairman is a non-
executive, zero otherwise 
RCSIZE (-) The number of directors serving on the remuneration committee 
NCSIZE (-) The number of directors serving on the nomination committee 
ACSIZE (-) The number of directors serving on the audit committee 
BOARDMEETS (-) The number of board meetings per annum 
RCMEETS (-) The number of remuneration committee meetings per annum 
ACMEETS (-) The number of audit committee meetings per annum 
NCMEETS (-) The number of nomination committee meetings per annum 
FEMALETOBOARD (-) The percentage of the board of directors when are female 
CEOBENEFITS (-) The ratio of annual benefits and bonuses to CEO total annual income 
CEOLONGCOMP (-) 
A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the CEO is remunerated 
with stock options or payments from performance plans, zero otherwise 
BENEFITS (-) 
A dummy variable that takes on a value of one if executives other than the 
CEO are compensated with benefits, bonuses, stock options or payments 
from performance plans, zero otherwise 
BLOCKOWN (+) The fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders 
LARGESTOWN (+) The fraction of outstanding shares owned by the largest block-holder 
DEBTRATIO (-) The ratio of total debt to total assets 
COMPANYSIZE (-) The market capitalization of the firm 
Notes: SPREAD = (ASK – BID)/ ((ASK + BID)/ 2) * 100. The annual average of the daily bid and ask prices and VOLATILITY, 
VOLUME, DEBTRATIO, BLOCKOWN and LARGESTOWNER are from Bloomberg and the rest of the corporate governance 
variables are from the companies’ annual reports.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Asymmetric Information’s Proxies 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SPREAD (%) 1336 0.04 39.98 2.44 3.43 
VOLATILITY (%) 1362 4.57 362.37 32.56 19.13 
VOLUME   
(in millions) 1373 13 16,012.55 499.96 1,271.07 
      
Panel B: Corporate Governance’s Proxies 
BSIZE (#) 947 2.00 40.00 8.48 3.05 
NONEXESIZE (#) 949 0.00 15.00 4.35 1.78 
SPLIT (dummy 0,1) 938 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.30 
NONEXECHAIR 
(dummy 0,1) 762 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.45 
RCSIZE (#) 866 0.00 12.00 3.63 1.37 
NCSIZE (#) 824 0.00 16.00 3.88 2.00 
ACSIZE (#) 870 0.00 12.00 3.56 1.35 
BOARDMEETINGS 
(#) 
871 0.00 63.00 8.85 3.48 
RCMEETS (#) 819 0.00 18.00 3.94 2.31 
ACMEETS (#) 867 0.00 10.00 3.43 1.46 
NCMEETS (#) 769 0.00 12.00 2.05 1.96 
FEMALTOBOARD 
% 
914 0.00 16.67 0.18 1.44 
CEOBENFITS % 1046 0.00 100.00 35.03 20.67 
CEOLONGCOMP 
(dummy 0,1) 539 0.00 1.00 0.91 0.29 
BENFITS (dummy 
0,1) 
538 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.27 
BLOCKOWN % 991 0.00 100.00 38.83 19.88 
LARGESTOWNER 
% 
995 0.00 95.84 16.19 12.75 
DEBTRATIO (%) 1332 0.00 184.50 19.04 18.39 
COMPANYSIZE 
(£m) 
1371 -12.80 177,533.
90 
2,719.55 10,847.32 
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   Table 4 
Pearson correlations between the corporate governance and asymmetric information variables, using the normal score for all continuous 
variables 
Panel A: Pearson correlations between corporate governance variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1  BSIZE  1.000              
2  NONEXESIZE  0.740*** 1.000             
3  RCSIZE  0.479*** 0.497*** 1.000            
4  NCSIZE  0.328*** 0.327*** 0.497*** 1.000           
5  ACSIZE  0.459*** 0.501*** 0.745*** 0.389*** 1.000          
6  BOARDMEETINGS  -0.091** -0.051 0.074* 0.014 0.005 1.000         
7  RCMEETS  0.286*** 0.309*** 0.309*** 0.262*** 0.279*** 0.170*** 1.000        
8  ACMEETS  0.365*** 0.403*** 0.305*** 0.248*** 0.306*** 0.070 0.435*** 1.000       
9  NCMEETS  0.297*** 0.285*** 0.251*** 0.410*** 0.254*** 0.071 0.451*** 0.394*** 1.000      
10  FEMALTOBOARD  0.078 0.066 0.097* 0.093* 0.077 0.044 0.154*** 0.034 0.040 1.000     
11  CEOBENFITS  0.209*** 0.204*** 0.164*** 0.136*** 0.160*** 0.001 0.174*** 0.196*** 0.175*** 0.062 1.000    
12  BLOCKOWN -0.186*** -0.122*** -0.078 -0.134*** -0.128*** 0.040 -0.238*** -0.166*** -0.176*** 0.012 -0.117**    
13  LARGESTOWNER  -0.136*** -0.103** -0.137*** -0.157*** -0.177*** -0.066 -0.223*** -0.147*** -0.188*** 0.040 -0.133*** 0.780*** 1.000  
14 COMPANYSIZE  0.556*** 0.607*** 0.373*** 0.269*** 0.390*** 0.020 0.295*** 0.451*** 0.305*** 0.094** 0.362*** -0.286*** -0.246*** 1.000 
15 DEBTRATIO 0.246*** 0.232*** 0.162*** 0.129*** 0.179*** -0.072 0.147*** 0.197*** 0.182*** 0.016 0.074* -0.157*** -0.121*** 0.430*** 
 
Panel B: the Pearson correlation between corporate governance variables and asymmetric information variables 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
16  SPREAD  -0.524*** -0.547*** -0.361*** -0.268*** -0.404*** 0.019 -0.358*** -0.449*** -0.335*** -0.132*** -0.368*** 0.316*** 0.279*** 
17  VOLATILITY  -0.218*** -0.203*** -0.171*** -0.131*** -0.128*** 0.118*** -0.130*** -0.154*** -0.144*** -0.047 -0.120*** 0.076* 0.107** 
18  VOLUME  0.429*** 0.479*** 0.323*** 0.242*** 0.344*** 0.048 0.263*** 0.365*** 0.306*** 0.005 0.307*** -0.272*** -0.279*** 
 
  14 15 16 17 
16  SPREAD  -0.785*** -0.299*** 1.000  
17 VOLATILITY  -0.252*** -0.094** 0.431*** 1.000 
18  VOLUME  0.698*** 0.217*** -0.595*** 0.054 
Notes: SPREAD is the main proxy for asymmetric information, the higher the spread ratio the higher the degree of asymmetric information. Accordingly, we correlate SPREAD 
with the other measures of asymmetric information. In panel B, SPREAD is significantly positively correlated with VOLATILITY and significantly negatively correlated with 
VOLUME. ***, ** indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. 
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Table 5 
Corporate Governance and Asymmetric information (Full model) 
 SPREAD (+) VOLATILITY (+) VOLUME (-) 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
(Constant) 0.057 0.152 0.055 0.176 -0.114* 0.062 
NONEXESIZE -0.331***
 
0.049 -0.098* 0.057 0.311*** 0.064 
SPLIT (dummy) 0.166 0.103 0.077 0.121 -0.061 0.135 
NONEXE 
CHAIR (dummy) 
-0.031 0.070 0.059 0.081 0.086 0.091 
NCSIZE -0.054 0.047 -0.147*** 0.054 0.058 0.061 
BOARD 
MEETINGS 
-0.012 0.042 0.093* 0.049 0.114** 0.054 
ACMEETS -0.167*** 0.047 -0.014 0.054 0.093 0.060 
FEMAL 
TOBOARD 
-0.066 0.052 0.004 0.061 -0.020 0.067 
CEOBENFITS -0.216*** 0.042 -0.059 0.048 0.213*** 0.053 
CEOLONG 
COMP (dummy) 
0.153 0.117 -0.022 0.138 -0.050 0.147 
BLOCKOWN 0.205*** 0.040 0.114** 0.047 -0.147*** 0.052 
DEBTRATIO -0.194*** 0.042 -0.108** 0.049 0.036 0.054 
N  318  325  327  
R- Squared 0.517  0.193  0.228  
Note: SPREAD and VOLATILITY are directly related to asymmetric information but VOLUME is 
inversely related to asymmetric information. All regression models use the normal score for all 
continuous variables. All regressions are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The regressions include all 
the independent variables (including the dummy variables), but exclude variables which had high 
collinearity. The standard errors SE are reported besides the coefficient Coef. and ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Corporate Governance and Asymmetric Information (reduced models) 
Panel A: Reduced model with main variables 
 SPREAD (+) VOLATILITY 
(+) 
VOLUME (-) 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
(Constant) -0.005 0.143 0.012 0.175 0.039 0.075 
NONEXESIZE -0.339*** 0.031 -0.145*** 0.041 0.323*** 0.038 
ACMEETS -0.221*** 0.032 0.005 0.043 0.212*** 0.039 
CEOBENFITS -0.184*** 0.029 -0.060 0.037 0.182*** 0.035 
BLOCKOWN 0.204*** 0.027 0.060* 0.036 -0.171*** 0.033 
DEBTRATIO -0.177*** 0.028 -0.150*** 0.037 0.025 0.034 
N  636  646  649  
R- Squared 0.530  0.158  0.312  
Panel B: Reduced model with alternative variables 
 SPREAD (+) VOLATILITY 
(+) 
VOLUME (-) 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
(Constant) -0.018 0.145 0.035 0.166 0.053 0.057 
BSIZE -0.333*** 0.032 -0.175*** 0.041 0.220*** 0.040 
RCMEETS -0.148*** 0.032 0.001 0.040 0.130*** 0.039 
CEOBENFITS -0.251*** 0.032 -0.116*** 0.040 0.233*** 0.038 
LARGEST 
OWNER 
0.136*** 0.029 0.059 0.037 -0.186*** 0.036 
DEBTRATIO -0.188*** 0.030 -0.117*** 0.038 0.036 0.037 
N  608  617  619  
R- Squared 0.469  0.163  0.227  
Note: In Panel A, we choose five of the most significant variables from those included in Table 5 one each 
representing our five hypothesis. Specifically, we expect an inverse relation between asymmetric information and 
ideal characteristics of the board (NONEXESIZE), activeness of the board (ACMEETS), performance enhancing 
compensation schemes (CEOBENEFITS) and debt burden (DEBTRATIO) and a direct relation with 
concentration of insider ownership (BLOCKOWN). In Panel B, for robustness we substitute those variables 
rejected earlier as they had high collinearity with other variables. In particular we replaced NONEXESIZE with 
BSIZE, ACMEETS with RCMEETS and BLOCKOWN with LARGESTOWNER. The standard errors SE are 
reported besides the coefficients Coef. and ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Robustness between corporate governance and asymmetric information: Stability by 
year 
Panel A: Reduced model with main variables 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
(Constant) 0.429*** 0.069 0.004 0.054 -0.226*** 0.052 -0.227*** 0.050 
NONEXESIZE -0.357*** 0.080 -0.426*** 0.066 -0.309*** 0.065 -0.311*** 0.052 
ACMEETS -0.264*** 0.070 -0.228*** 0.051 -0.192*** 0.060 -0.227*** 0.052 
CEOBENFITS -0.155** 0.077 -0.187*** 0.061 -0.148*** 0.051 -0.231*** 0.058 
BLOCKOWN 0.237*** 0.078 0.232*** 0.056 0.188*** 0.058 0.195*** 0.055 
DEBTRATIO -0.062 0.067 -0.138*** 0.052 -0.235*** 0.065 -0.206*** 0.046 
N  102  131  211  192  
R- Squared 0.411  0.553  0.405  0.540  
Panel B: Reduced model with alternative variables 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
(Constant) 0.444*** 0.080 0.017 0.059 -0.245*** 0.056 -0.262*** 0.050 
BSIZE -0.260*** 0.099 -0.356*** 0.068 -0.316*** 0.071 -0.379*** 0.070 
RCMEETS -0.048 0.074 -0.155** 0.069 -0.180*** 0.057 -0.159** 0.063 
CEOBENFITS -0.266*** 0.095 -0.304*** 0.068 -0.203*** 0.062 -0.237*** 0.064 
LARGEST 
OWNER 
0.260** 0.106 0.180*** 0.054 0.083 0.054 0.106* 0.057 
DEBTRATIO -0.062 0.087 -0.144*** 0.056 -0.256*** 0.067 -0.217*** 0.051 
N  91  120  206  191  
R- Squared 0.342  0.494  0.359  0.491  
Note: In Panel A, we choose five of the most significant variables from those included in Table 5, one for each of 
our five hypotheses. Specifically, we expect an inverse relation between asymmetric information and ideal 
characteristics of the board (NONEXESIZE), board activity(ACMEETS), performance related compensation 
schemes (CEOBENEFITS) and debt burden (DEBTRATIO) and a direct relation with concentration of insider 
ownership (BLOCKOWN). In Panel B, for robustness we substitute the variables dropped earlier as they had high 
collinearity with other variables. In particular we replaced NONEXESIZE with BSIZE, ACMEETS with 
RCMEETS and BLOCKOWN with LARGESTOWNER. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Robustness between corporate governance and asymmetric information: Stability by 
company size and by industry classification 
Panel A: Reduced model with main variables 
 Large Small Industrial Non-Industrial 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
(Constant) -0.379*** 0.114 0.359*** 0.101 0.069 0.144 -0.059 0.143 
NONEXESIZE -0.351*** 0.039 -0.103** 0.048 -0.239*** 0.054 -0.345*** 0.040 
ACMEETS -0.220*** 0.039 -0.150*** 0.046 -0.233*** 0.045 -0.231*** 0.043 
CEOBENFITS -0.072** 0.036 -0.181*** 0.040 -0.299*** 0.043 -0.129*** 0.038 
BLOCKOWN 0.136*** 0.032 0.130*** 0.041 0.175*** 0.041 0.231*** 0.036 
DEBTRATIO -0.003 0.036 -0.085** 0.041 -0.094** 0.041 -0.233*** 0.037 
N  331  305  253  383  
R- Squared 0.423  0.233  0.545  0.537  
Panel B: Reduced model with alternative variables 
 Large Small Industrial Non-Industrial 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
(Constant) -0.445*** 0.136 0.343*** 0.088 0.095 0.153 -0.094 0.141 
BSIZE -0.266*** 0.041 -0.116** 0.048 -0.189*** 0.053 -0.375*** 0.042 
RCMEETS -0.128*** 0.038 -0.098** 0.046 -0.175*** 0.044 -0.132*** 0.044 
CEOBENFITS -0.128*** 0.041 -0.231*** 0.044 -0.325*** 0.047 -0.218*** 0.042 
LARGEST 
OWNER 
0.111*** 0.033 0.095** 0.044 0.149*** 0.043 0.148*** 0.038 
DEBTRATIO -0.029 0.041 -0.086** 0.042 -0.152*** 0.044 -0.216*** 0.041 
N  318  290  241  367  
R- Squared 0.292  0.231  46.7  48.7  
Note: In Panel A, we choose five of the most significant variables from those included in Table 5, one for each of 
our five hypotheses. Specifically, we expect an inverse relation between asymmetric information and ideal 
characteristics of the board (NONEXESIZE), board activity (ACMEETS), performance related compensation 
schemes (CEOBENEFITS) and debt burden (DEBTRATIO) and a direct relation with concentration of insider 
ownership (BLOCKOWN). In Panel B, for robustness we substitute the variables dropped earlier as they had high 
collinearity with other variables. In particular we replaced NONEXESIZE with BSIZE, ACMEETS with 
RCMEETS and BLOCKOWN with LARGESTOWNER. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
